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宋铮:A Theory of Intergenerational Predation through Debt

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摘要:We propose a dynamic politico-economic theory of public good provision and debt accumulation whose driver is the intergenerational conflict between successive generations of voters endowed with a low altruism toward their offspring . The Markov equilibrium with repeated voting is equivalent to a social planning problem where the decision maker has quasi-geometric discounting, with a low short-term discount rate. This translates into a demand for fiscal discipline, i.e., low taxes and low debt accumulation. In spite of low altruism, the political equilibrium may converge to an equilibrium with moderate debt and positive public good provision. Debt accumulation is kept in check by the desire of privately a­ uent young voters to avert a future scenario of public poverty. However, fiscal discipline is weakened if agents can leave negative bequests to their heirs. In this case, the economy may attain immiseration.

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