注册 投稿
经济金融网 中国经济学教育科研网 中国经济学年会 EFN通讯社

Preventing Bank Runs

文件大小:未知

级别评定:

添加时间:2015-09-28 11:31:27

最后更新:2015-09-28 12:54:35

下载积分:0分 (只有会员文件下载时才需要相应积分验证)

总浏览:

总下载:4

发布人:george15135

  • 如果您发现该资源不能下载,请在本站论坛提出,管理员会及时处理。
  • 未经本站明确许可,任何网站不得非法盗链及抄袭本站资源。
  • 本站资源均为网友提供交流,仅供教学、研究使用,请下载后24小时内自行删除。
    0
资源简介

Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is commonly understood as providing a formal rationale for the existence of bank-run equilibria. It has never been clear, however, whether bank-run equilibria in this framework are a natural byproduct of the economic environment or an artifact of suboptimal contractual arrangements. In the class of direct mechanisms, Peck and Shell (2003) demonstrate that bank-run equilibria can exist under an optimal contractual arrangement. The difficulty of preventing runs within this class of mechanism is that banks cannot identify whether withdrawals are being driven by psychology or by fundamentals. Our solution to this problem is an indirect mechanism with the following two properties. First, it provides depositors an incentive to communicate whether they believe a run is on or not. Second, the mechanism threatens a suspension of convertibility conditional on what is revealed in these communications. Together, these two properties can eliminate the prospect of bank-run equilibria in the Diamond-Dybvig environment.


KEYWORDS: bank runs, optimal deposit contract, financial fragility.

 
资源评论

快速入口
回到顶部
深圳网站建设