注册 投稿
经济金融网 中国经济学教育科研网 中国经济学年会 EFN通讯社

Liquidity hoarding

文件大小:未知

级别评定:★★★★★

添加时间:2015-12-14 14:28:12

最后更新:2015-12-14 14:41:09

下载积分:0分 (只有会员文件下载时才需要相应积分验证)

总浏览:

总下载:1

发布人:george15135

  • 如果您发现该资源不能下载,请在本站论坛提出,管理员会及时处理。
  • 未经本站明确许可,任何网站不得非法盗链及抄袭本站资源。
  • 本站资源均为网友提供交流,仅供教学、研究使用,请下载后24小时内自行删除。
    0
资源简介

Theoretical Economics 8 (2013), 291–324
 

Liquidity hoarding

Douglas Gale and Tanju Yorulmazer


 

Abstract


 

Banks hold liquid and illiquid assets. An illiquid bank that receives a liquidity shock sells assets to liquid banks in exchange for cash. We characterize the constrained efficient allocation as the solution to a planner's problem and show that the market equilibrium is constrained inefficient, with too little liquidity and inefficient hoarding. Our model features a precautionary as well as a speculative motive for hoarding liquidity, but the inefficiency of liquidity provision can be traced to the incompleteness of markets (due to private information) and the increased price volatility that results from trading assets for cash.


 

Keywords: Interbank market, fire sale, market freeze, cash-in-the-market pricing


 

JEL classification: G12, G21, G24, G32, G33, D8
资源评论

快速入口
回到顶部
深圳网站建设