Wall Street occupations
ULF AXELSON and PHILIP BOND
May 17, 2014
ABSTRACT
Many
nance jobs entail the risk of large losses, together with hard-to-monitor e¤ort. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting. We show that
nance jobs feature high compensation, up-or-out promotion and long work hours, while giving strictly more utility to employees than other jobs. Moral hazard problems in
nance are exacerbated in booms, even though pay increases. Employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into high-paying
nance jobs, while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are too hard to manage.
JEL codes: E24, G24, J31, J33, J41, M51, M52
Keywords: Investment Banking, Compensation Contracts