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资源简介
Bank Liability Structure
 
Suresh Sundaresan; Columbia University 
Zhenyu Wang; Indiana University
 
March 2014
 
Abstract
We develop, and solve analytically, a dynamic model of optimal bank liability structure that incorporates bank run, regulatory closure, endogenous default, and  endogenous deposit-insurance premium. Value-maximizing banks choose the ratio of deposits to subordinated debt so that endogenous default coincides with bank closure. Banks’ optimal response to regulatory changes often counteracts regulators’objective in reducing bank failures. For example, the optimal response to the introduction of FDIC is to increase leverage by choosing a higher deposit ratio and   a lower subordinated-debt ratio. We also find that banks’ optimal leverage can be substantial even in the absence of material tax benefits.
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