Decision Sciences and the New Case for Paternalism: a Critique
Abstract
Several authors have recently claimed that empirical findings from distinct
decision sciences provide compelling reasons in favour of paternalistic
interference. Some advocate a so-called new case for paternalism, according to
which the available behavioural and neuro-psychological findings enable
paternalists to address traditional anti-paternalistic objections and reliably
enhance the well-being of their target agents. In this paper, I combine insights
from moral philosophy, decision-making research and evidence-based policy
evaluation to assess the merits of this case. In particular, I articulate and defend
three complementary arguments to demonstrate that, contrary to emerging
consensus, the new paternalists have not put forward compelling reasons in
favour of paternalistic interference. In doing so, I identify the main challenges
faced by the new case for paternalism and explicate the implications of these
challenges for the ongoing philosophical debate about the moral justifiability of
paternalistic interference.
Keywords: Paternalism; Well-being; Evidence-based Policy Evaluation;
Decision-making; Moral Justification.
