Repression and the Spread of Protest
Mehdi Shadmehry Raphael Boleslavskyz
Abstract
We analyze the strategic interaction between a state that must decide whether to repress a group of activists, and a bystander citizen, representing the public, who must decide whether to protest following the state's repression. The bystander is uncertain about both the nature
of the activists' demands and the intentions of the state that represses them. We show that the information revealed by the state's repression can cause the spread of protest, and the potential for repression backre depends on social norms, economic conditions, whether the reforms are minor or fundamental, and the popularity of the activists. We then characterize
the subtle strategic interactions that arise when the regime can ex-ante set up institutions (e.g.,independent judiciary) that limit its repression capacity. We show that commitment power may, paradoxically, increase repression, and highlight the non-monotone relationship between the activists' popularity and the likelihood of repression.
JEL Codes: D74, D83.
Keywords: Repression, Repression Backre, Protest, Judicial Independence, Legitimate Coer-
cion, Social Norms.