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联邦制中职业发展的限制:来自中国的证据

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资源简介

The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism:
Evidence from China

Forthcoming, Journal of the European Economics Association

 

 


Petra Persson

 主页:http://www.stanford.edu/~perssonp/index.html

The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism: Evidence from China


Petra Persson


Stanford University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

 

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya


Paris School of Economics

December 31, 2014
 


Abstract:     
 

Performance-based promotion schemes in administrative hierarchies have limitations. Chinese provincial leaders, despite facing strong career concerns, make different policy decisions depending on their career backgrounds. Provincial party secretaries who rose from low to high positions within the province they govern ("locals'') spend a higher share of budgetary resources on education and health care and invest less in construction infrastructure than party secretaries who made their most significant career advancements in other provinces ("outsiders''). Identification comes from variation in central leadership and term limits. As the promotion mechanism rewards infrastructure investments, locals are less likely to be promoted at the end of the term. We explore various mechanisms and provide evidence that the difference between locals and outsiders is not driven by knowledge or experience, but can be explained by locals catering to low-level provincial elites, who helped them rise to power. Thus, local career trajectories limit the power of career concerns by fostering competing allegiances.

 

Number of Pages in PDF File: 71

Keywords: federalism, China, elite capture, democracy, social networks, public goods

 

JEL Classification: H11, H70, P26

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