Alessandro Pavan 2001年毕业于法国著名的图卢兹大学经济系，师从于经济学大师jean tirole。Alessandro Pavan现为西北大学经济系汇丰银行讲座教授（HSBC Research Professor）， Journal of Economic Theory首席主编。他的研究领域是信息经济学、博弈论、机制设计。

http://www.economics.northwestern.edu/people/directory/alessandro-pavan.html

Alessandro Pavan's research concerns the analysis of the role of information in strategic situations of interest to both micro and macro economists. In particular, his research focuses on global games, the social value of information and coordination, mechanism design, matching, and two-sided markets. He is Lead Editor of the Journal of Economic Theory, and Foreign Editor of the Review of Economic Studies.

Alessandro Pavan个人主页：http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~apa522/

Publications:

•  Introduction to JET Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design

(With Dirk Bergemann) -- forthcoming in JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY

•  Introduction to JET Symposium on Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions

(With Xavier Vives) -- forthcoming in JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY

•  Many-to-Many Matching and Price Discrimination (**)

          (With Renato Gomes) -- forthcoming in THEORETICAL ECONOMICS

•   Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Variational Approach         

          (With Daniel Garrett)  -- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, forthcoming — Supplementary Material

Results in the previous version no longer in the paper can be found at  Dynamic Managerial Compensation: OLD VERSION  

•   Information Acquisition and Welfare 

           (With Luca Colombo and Gianluca Femminis) -- REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 81, October 2014, 81, 1438-1483.

•   Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach ---- Supplementary Material 

           (With Ilya Segal and Juuso Toikka) -- ECONOMETRICA, 82(2), 601-653. It supersedes the old (finite-horizon) version circulated under the same title as well as the notes on

"Infinite Horizon Mechanism Design". Some earlier results are in my solo paper Long-Term Contracting in a Changing World

•   Selection-Free Predictions in Global Games with Endogenous Information and Multiple Equilibria  (*)

         (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, Vol. 8(3), September 2013, 883-938 -- supersedes the paper "Preempting Speculative Attacks: Robust Predictions in a Global Game with Multiple Equilibria"

• Managerial Turnover in a Changing World 

           (With Daniel Garrett) -- JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 120(5), October 2012, 879-925 --  Supplementary Material

•   Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games  

           (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS, 2(2), May 2010, 132-190

• Policy with Dispersed Information (*)

           (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 7(1), March 2009, 11-60.

•  Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 

           (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 144(2), February 2009, 503-531.

• On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency 

           (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, Vol. 64(1), September 2008, 329-334

• Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information (*)

           (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- ECONOMETRICA, Vol. 75(4), July 2007, 1103-1142.  Supplementary Material

• Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks 

           (With George-Marios Angeletos and Christian Hellwig) -- ECONOMETRICA, Vol. 75(3), May 2007, 711-756.   Supplementary Material

• Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications (*)

           (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, Vol. 5(3), May 2007, 585-593 -- NBER version with mathematical appendix

•  On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 

           (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 130(1), September 2006, 168-204 -- This work builds on a previous paper "Optimal Design of Privacy Policies."

•  Monopoly with Resale 

           (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol. 37(2), Summer 2006, 362-375 --  Supplementary Material

•  Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps 

           (With George-Marios Angeletos and Christian Hellwig) -- JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 114(3), June 2006, 452-485.  Supplementary Material

•  Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions 

           (With Marco LiCalzi) -- EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 49, January 2005, 227-250 -- Accepted when EER was JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

• Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 

           (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 94(1), May 2004, 91-98 (Papers and Proceedings)