◆ 证监会最新审核环境及审核要点分析

2017-05-17

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◆ 行为金融学大家：NICHOLAS C. BARBERIS

2015-12-22

★★★★★

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Nicholas C. Barberis现任耶鲁大学管理学院Stephen & Camille Schramm金融学讲座教授，他本科毕业于剑桥大学，博士则毕业于行为金融学的大本营之一——哈佛大学经济系，师从于shleifer等著名金融学大师。他与导师及同事合作的如下文...章："A Model of Investor Sentiment","Prospect Theory and Asset Prices","Style Investing" "Comovement"成为行为金融学领域的必读经典。2003年， Barberis受邀与Richard Thaler共同为Handbook of the Economics of Finance撰写了学术界第一份翔实、权威的行为金融研究综述："A Survey of Behavioral Finance"   Nicholas C. Barberis (born September 1971) is the Stephen & Camille Schramm Professor of Finance at the Yale School of Management. Professor Barberis' research focuses on behavioral finance and in particular, on applications of cognitive psychology to understanding the pricing of financial assets. Barberis earned his B.A. from Jesus College, Cambridge in 1991 and Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1996.   Nicholas C. Barberis个人主页：   http://faculty.som.yale.edu/nicholasbarberis/   Curriculum vitae Click here for a recent curriculum vitae.     Overview of my research Click here for a description of my research agenda.     Research papers The goal of much of my work is to build analytical foundations for behavioral finance, a large and active subfield of financial economics which studies the implications of less than fully rational behavior on the part of some market participants.   "Extrapolation and Bubbles", (with Robin Greenwood, Lawrence Jin, and Andrei Shleifer), September 2015. "Prospect Theory and Stock Returns: An Empirical Test", (with Abhiroop Mukherjee and Baolian Wang), November 2014. "X-CAPM: An Extrapolative Capital Asset Pricing Model", (with Robin Greenwood, Lawrence Jin, and Andrei Shleifer), Journal of Financial Economics 115, 1-24, January 2015.Awarded the 2014 Jack Treynor Prize for research. "Using Neural Data to Test a Theory of Investor Behavior: An Application to Realization Utility", (with Cary Frydman, Colin Camerer, Peter Bossaerts, and Antonio Rangel), Journal of Finance 69, 907-946, April 2014. "The Psychology of Tail Events: Progress and Challenges", American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 103, 611-616, May 2013. "Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and Assessment", Journal of Economic Perspectives 27, 173-196, Winter 2013. "Psychology and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008", in Financial Innovation: Too Much or Too Little?, Michael Haliassos ed., MIT Press, 2013. "Realization Utility" (with Wei Xiong), Journal of Financial Economics 104, 251-271, May 2012. Non-technical summary here Two of my colleagues significantly advance this agenda here. "A Model of Casino Gambling", Management Science 58, 35-51, January 2012 (Special Issue on Behavioral Economics). Another version here with some additional material (Sections 4.3, 4.4, 7.2, and 7.3) Some slides here Non-technical summary here. "Preferences with Frames: A New Utility Specification that Allows for the Framing of Risks" (with Ming Huang), Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33, 1555-1576, August 2009. Non-technical summary here. "What Drives the Disposition Effect? An Analysis of a Long-standing Preference-based Explanation" (with Wei Xiong), Journal of Finance 64, 751-784, April 2009. Non-technical summary here. "Stocks as Lotteries: The Implications of Probability Weighting for Security Prices" (with Ming Huang), American Economic Review 98, 2066-2100, December 2008. Non-technical summary here. "The Loss Aversion / Narrow Framing Approach to the Equity Premium Puzzle" (with Ming Huang), Handbook of the Equity Risk Premium, R. Mehra ed., North Holland, Amsterdam, 2008. "Individual Preferences, Monetary Gambles, and Stock Market Participation: A Case for Narrow Framing" (with Ming Huang and Richard Thaler), American Economic Review 96, 1069-1090, September 2006. Non-technical summary here. "Comovement" (with Andrei Shleifer and Jeffrey Wurgler), Journal of Financial Economics 75, 283-317, February 2005. Non-technical summary here. "Style Investing" (with Andrei Shleifer), Journal of Financial Economics 68, 161-199, May 2003. Non-technical summary here. "A Survey of Behavioral Finance" (with Richard Thaler), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, G. Constantinides, R. Stulz, M. Harris eds., North Holland, Amsterdam, 2003. "Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, and Individual Stock Returns" (with Ming Huang), Journal of Finance 56, 1247-1292, August 2001. Non-technical summary here. "Prospect Theory and Asset Prices" (with Ming Huang and Tano Santos), Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 1-53, February 2001. Awarded the 2000 FAME Research Prize. Non-technical summary here. "Investing for the Long Run when Returns are Predictable", Journal of Finance 55, 225-264, February 2000. Awarded the 2000 Paul A. Samuelson Prize. "A Model of Investor Sentiment" (with Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny), Journal of Financial Economics 49, 307-343, September 1998. Non-technical summary here. "How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian shops" (with Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Natalia Tsukanova), Journal of Political Economy 104, 764-790, August 1996. Barberis也是意外出色的研究生导师，至今指导了如下博士生：   Former and current students I learn a lot by working with PhD students and helping them with their dissertation work. Here are links to some of the students I have advised in past years. I very much recommend taking a look at their work if you are not already familiar with it! Lauren Cohen (HBS) Henrik Cronqvist (Miami) Yaxin Duan (Federal Reserve Board) Andrea Frazzini (AQR Capital) Cary Frydman (USC) Keith Gamble (DePaul) Simon Huang (SMU) Wenxi Jiang (Chinese University of Hong Kong) Lawrence Jin (Caltech) Bige Kahraman (Oxford) Peter Kelly (Notre Dame) Dong Lou (LSE) Abhiroop Mukherjee (HKUST) Michaela Pagel (Columbia GSB) Allen Poteshman (D.E. Shaw) Denis Sosyura (Michigan) Lei Xie (AQR Capital) Baolian Wang (Fordham) Deniz Yavuz (Purdue)  

◆ 著名宏观经济学家 Golosov

2015-12-15

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Mikhail Golosov2004年获得明尼苏达大学经济学博士学位，随后先后任教于MIT、耶鲁大学经济系，2011-2015年担任普林斯顿大学经济系正教授，2015年起担任化学银行经济学讲座教授。Mikhail Golosov的研究领域包括：宏观经济学、公共经济学、政治经济学。他在新公共财政、最...优税收理论、货币经济学等领域做出了开拓性的贡献。   http://scholar.princeton.edu/golosov/   Mikhail Golosov is a professor of economics at Princeton University. Dr. Golosov has also held positions at Yale University and the Massachussetts Institute of Technology. He is an associate editor of Econometrica and the Review of Economic Studies. Dr. Golosov was awarded the Sloan Research Fellowship as well as the National Science Foundation CAREER Grant. His is a fellow of the Econometric Society and a distinguished CESifo affiliate. His research covers topics in macroeconomics, public finance and political economy.   2015 Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A., 2015. Policy Implications of Dynamic Public Finance . Annual Review of Economics, 7, pp.147-171. paper 2014 Golosov, M., et al., 2014. Optimal Taxes on Fossil Fuel in General Equilibrium. Econometrica, 81(2), pp.41-88. Publisher's Version paper additional material Golosov, M., et al., 2014. Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission. Journal of Economic Theory, 151, pp.304-341. paper Golosov, M., Lorenzoni, G. & Tsyvinski, A., 2014. Decentralized Trading with Private Information. Econometrica, 82(3), pp.1055–1091. Publisher's Version paper supplementary material 2013 Golosov, M., et al., 2013. Optimal Pension Systems with Simple Instruments. American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 103(3), pp.502–507. paper Golosov, M., Maziero, P. & Menzio, G., 2013. Taxation and Redistribution of Residual Income Inequality. Journal of Political Economy, 121(6), pp.116-1204. Publisher's Version paper Golosov, M., et al., 2013. Preference Heterogeneity and Optimal Commodity Taxation. Journal of Public Economics, 97(1), pp.160-175. paper 2012 Acemoglu, D., et al., 2012. A Dynamic Theory of Resource Wars. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1), pp.283-331. paper Golosov, M., Tsyvinski, A. & Chari, V.V., 2012. Patents and Prizes: Using Market Signals to Provide Incentives for Innovations. Journal of Economic Theory, 147(2), pp.781-801. paper 2011 Golosov, M., Troshkin, M. & Tsyvinski, A., 2011. Optimal Taxation: Merging Micro and Macro Approaches. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43(Supplement s1), pp.147-174. paper Acemoglu, D., Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A., 2011. Power Fluctuations and Political Economy. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(3), pp.1009-1041. paper Acemoglu, D., Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A., 2011. Political Economy of Ramsey Taxation. Journal of Public Economics, 95(7-8), pp.467-475. paper 2010 Golosov, M., 2010. Comment on "In Search of Real Rigidities. In in NBER Macroeconomic Annual 2010. MIT Press. paper Acemoglu, D., Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A., 2010. Dynamic Mirrlees Taxation under Political Economy Constraints. Review of Economic Studies, 77(3), pp.841-881. paper technical appendix 2009 Golosov, M., Farhi, E. & Tsyvinski, A., 2009. A Theory of Liquidity and Regulation of Financial Intermediation. Review of Economic Studies, 76(3), pp.973-992. paper 2008 Acemoglu, D., Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A., 2008. Political Economy of Mechanisms. Econometrica, 76(3), pp.619-641. paper Acemoglu, D., Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A., 2008. Markets versus Governments. Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(1), pp.159-189. paper Acemoglu, D., Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A., 2008. Political Economy of Intermediate Goods Taxation. Journal Of European Economic Association, 6(2-3), pp.353-366. paper 2007 Golosov, M., Jones, L. & Tertilt, M., 2007. Efficiency with Endogenous Population Growth. Econometrica, 75(4), pp.1039-1072. paper Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A., 2007. Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), pp.487-534. paper Golosov, M. & Lucas, R., 2007. Menu Costs and Phillips Curves. Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), pp.171-199. paper 2006 Golosov, M., Tsyvinski, A. & Werning, I., 2006. New Dynamic Public Finance: A User’s Guide. In NBER Macroeconomic Annual 2006. MIT Press. paper Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A., 2006. Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing. Journal of Political Economy, 114(2), pp.257-279. paper 2003 Golosov, M., Kocherlakota, N. & Tsyvinski, A., 2003. Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation. Review of Economic Studies, 70, pp.569-587. paper    

◆ 著名微观理论学家：Alessandro Pavan

2015-12-15

★★★★★

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Alessandro Pavan 2001年毕业于法国著名的图卢兹大学经济系，师从于经济学大师jean tirole。Alessandro Pavan现为西北大学经济系汇丰银行讲座教授（HSBC Research Professor）， Journal of Economic Theory...首席主编。他的研究领域是信息经济学、博弈论、机制设计。 http://www.economics.northwestern.edu/people/directory/alessandro-pavan.html   Alessandro Pavan's research concerns the analysis of the role of information in strategic situations of interest to both micro and macro economists. In particular, his research focuses on global games, the social value of information and coordination, mechanism design, matching, and two-sided markets. He is Lead Editor of the Journal of Economic Theory, and Foreign Editor of the Review of Economic Studies.   Alessandro Pavan个人主页：http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~apa522/     Publications:    Introduction to JET Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design (With Dirk Bergemann) -- forthcoming in JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY    Introduction to JET Symposium on Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions (With Xavier Vives) -- forthcoming in JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY    Many-to-Many Matching and Price Discrimination (**)           (With Renato Gomes) -- forthcoming in THEORETICAL ECONOMICS     Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Variational Approach                    (With Daniel Garrett)  -- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, forthcoming — Supplementary Material Results in the previous version no longer in the paper can be found at  Dynamic Managerial Compensation: OLD VERSION       Information Acquisition and Welfare             (With Luca Colombo and Gianluca Femminis) -- REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 81, October 2014, 81, 1438-1483.     Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach ---- Supplementary Material             (With Ilya Segal and Juuso Toikka) -- ECONOMETRICA, 82(2), 601-653. It supersedes the old (finite-horizon) version circulated under the same title as well as the notes on "Infinite Horizon Mechanism Design". Some earlier results are in my solo paper Long-Term Contracting in a Changing World     Selection-Free Predictions in Global Games with Endogenous Information and Multiple Equilibria  (*)          (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, Vol. 8(3), September 2013, 883-938 -- supersedes the paper "Preempting Speculative Attacks: Robust Predictions in a Global Game with Multiple Equilibria"   Managerial Turnover in a Changing World             (With Daniel Garrett) -- JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 120(5), October 2012, 879-925 --  Supplementary Material     Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games              (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS, 2(2), May 2010, 132-190   Policy with Dispersed Information (*)            (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 7(1), March 2009, 11-60.    Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals             (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 144(2), February 2009, 503-531.   On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency             (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, Vol. 64(1), September 2008, 329-334   Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information (*)            (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- ECONOMETRICA, Vol. 75(4), July 2007, 1103-1142.  Supplementary Material   Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks             (With George-Marios Angeletos and Christian Hellwig) -- ECONOMETRICA, Vol. 75(3), May 2007, 711-756.   Supplementary Material   Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications (*)            (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, Vol. 5(3), May 2007, 585-593 -- NBER version with mathematical appendix    On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting             (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 130(1), September 2006, 168-204 -- This work builds on a previous paper "Optimal Design of Privacy Policies."    Monopoly with Resale             (With Giacomo Calzolari) -- RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol. 37(2), Summer 2006, 362-375 --  Supplementary Material    Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps             (With George-Marios Angeletos and Christian Hellwig) -- JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 114(3), June 2006, 452-485.  Supplementary Material    Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions             (With Marco LiCalzi) -- EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 49, January 2005, 227-250 -- Accepted when EER was JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION   Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities             (With George-Marios Angeletos) -- AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 94(1), May 2004, 91-98 (Papers and Proceedings)  

◆ 著名青年行为经济学家：Botond Kőszegi

2015-12-15

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Botond Kőszegi毕业于MIT经济系，之后任教于加州大学伯克利分校经济系，取得终身教职后返回祖国匈牙利的中欧大学经济系任教。Botond Kőszegi的研究领域为博弈论、行为经济学。       http://www.personal.ceu.hu/...staff/Botond_Koszegi/   PEER-REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS   On the Welfare Costs of Naivete in the US Credit-Card MarketAbstract: In the presence of naive consumers, a participation distortion arises in competitive markets because the additional profits from naive consumers lead competitive firms to lower transparent prices below cost. Using a simple calibration, we argue that the participation distortion in the US credit-card market may be large. Our results call for a redirection of some of the large amount of empirical research on the quantification of the welfare losses from market power, to the quantification of welfare losses that are due to the firms’ reactions to consumer misunderstandings. Joint with Paul Heidhues. Review of Industrial Organization (2015), 47(3), pp. 341-354.   Exploitative InnovationAbstract: We analyze innovation incentives in a simple model of a competitive retail market with naive consumers. Firms selling perfect substitutes play a game consisting of an innovation stage and a pricing stage. At the pricing stage, firms simultaneously set a transparent "up-front price" and an "additional price," and decide whether to shroud the additional price from naive consumers. To capture especially financial products such as banking services, credit cards, and mutual funds, we allow for a floor on the product's up-front price. At the preceding innovation stage, a firm can invest either in increasing the product's value (value-increasing innovation) or in increasing the maximum additional price (exploitative innovation). We show that if the price floor is not binding, the incentive for either kind of innovation equal the "appropriable part" of the innovation, implying similar incentives for exploitative and value-increasing innovations. If the price floor is binding, however, innovation incentives are often stronger for exploitative than for value-increasing innovations. Because learning ways to charge higher additional prices increases the profits from shrouding and thereby lowers the motive to unshroud, a firm may have strong incentives to make appropriable exploitative innovations, and even stronger incentives to make non-appropriable exploitative innovations. In contrast, the incentive to make non-appropriable value-increasing innovations is zero or negative, and even the incentive to make appropriable value-increasing innovations is strong only if the product is socially wasteful. These results help explain why firms in the financial industry have been willing to make innovations others could easily copy, and why these innovations often seem to have included exploitative features. Joint with Paul Heidhues and Takeshi Murooka. Accepted, AEJ: Micro. Updated December 2014.   Behavioral Contract TheoryAbstract: This review provides a critical survey of psychology-and-economics ("behavioral-economics") research in contract theory. First, I introduce the theories of individual decisionmaking most frequently used in behavioral contract theory, and formally illustrate some of their implications in contracting settings. Second, I provide a more comprehensive (but informal) survey of the psychology-and-economics work on classical contract-theoretic topics: moral hazard, screening, mechanism design, and incomplete contracts. I also summarize research on a new topic spawned by psychology and economics, exploitative contracting, that studies contracts designed primarily to take advantage of agent mistakes. Journal of Economic Literature (2014), 52(4), pp. 1075-1118.   True Context-Dependent Preferences? The Causes of Market-Dependent ValuationsAbstract: A central assumption of neoclassical economics is that reservation prices for familiar products express people’s true preferences for these products, that is, they represent the total benefit that a good confers to the consumers, and are thus, independent of actual prices in the market. Nevertheless, a vast amount of research has shown that valuations can be sensitive to other salient prices; particularly when individuals are explicitly anchored on them. In this paper, the authors extend previous research on single-price anchoring and study the sensitivity of valuations to the distribution of prices found for the product in the market. In addition, they examine its possible causes. They find that market-dependent valuations cannot be fully explained by rational inferences consumers draw about a product’s value, and are unlikely to be fully explained by true market-dependent preferences. Rather, the market dependence of valuations likely reflects consumers’ focus on something other than the total benefit that the product confers to them. Furthermore, this paper shows that market-dependent valuations persist when – as in many real-life settings – individuals make repeated purchase decisions over time and infer the distribution of the product’s prices from their market experience. Finally, the authors consider the implications of their findings for marketers and consumers. Joint with Nina Mazar and Dan Ariely. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making (2014), 27; pp. 200-208.   Regular Prices and SalesAbstract: It is widely known that loss aversion leads individuals to dislike risk, and as has been argued by many researchers, in many instances this creates an incentive for firms to shield consumers and employees against economic risks. Complementing previous research, we show that consumer loss aversion can also have the opposite effect: it can lead a firm to optimally introduce risk into an otherwise deterministic environment. We consider a profit-maximizing monopolist selling to a loss-averse consumer, where (following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006)) we assume that the consumer's reference point is her recent rational expectations about the purchase. We establish that for any degree of consumer loss aversion, the monopolist's optimal price distribution consists of low and variable "sale" prices and a high and atomic "regular" price. Realizing that she will buy at the sale prices and hence that she will purchase with positive probability, the consumer chooses to avoid the painful uncertainty in whether she will get the product by buying also at the regular price. This pricing pattern is consistent with several recently documented facts regarding retailer pricing. We show that market power is crucial for this result: when firms compete ex ante for consumers, they choose deterministic prices. Joint with Paul Heidhues. Theoretical Economics (2014), 9; pp. 217-251. Older (2011) version.   A Model of Focusing in Economic ChoiceAbstract: We present a generally applicable theory of focusing based on the hypothesis that a person focuses more on, and hence overweights, attributes in which her options differ more. Our model predicts that the decisionmaker is too prone to choose options with concentrated advantages relative to alternatives, but maximizes utility when the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives are equally concentrated. Applying our model to intertemporal choice, these results predict that a person exhibits present bias and time inconsistency when -- such as in lifestyle choices and other widely invoked applications of hyperbolic discounting -- the future effect of a current decision is distributed over many dates, and the effects of multiple decisions accumulate. But unlike in previous models, in our theory (1) present bias is lower when the costs of current misbehavior are less dispersed, helping to explain why people respond more to monetary incentives than to health concerns in harmful consumption; and (2) time inconsistency is lower when a person commits to fewer decisions with accumulating effects in her ex-ante choice. In addition, a person does not fully maximize welfare even when making decisions ex ante: (3) she commits to too much of an activity -- e.g., exercise or work -- that is beneficial overall; and (4) makes "future-biased" commitments when -- such as in preparing for a big event -- the benefit of many periods' effort is concentrated in a single goal. Joint with Ádám Szeidl. Quarterly Journal of Economics (2013), 128(1); pp. 53-107. Older version.   Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the Credit MarketAbstract: We analyze contract choices, loan-repayment behavior, and welfare in a model of a competitive credit market when borrowers have a taste for immediate gratification. Consistent with many credit cards and subprime mortgages, for most types of non-sophisticated borrowers the baseline repayment terms are cheap, but they are also inefficiently front-loaded and delays require paying large penalties. Although credit is for future consumption, non-sophisticated consumers overborrow, pay the penalties, and back-load repayment, suffering large welfare losses. Prohibiting large penalties for deferring small amounts of repayment -- akin to recent regulations in the US credit-card and mortgage markets -- can raise welfare. Joint with Paul Heidhues. American Economic Review (2010), 100(5), pp. 2279-2303. Web Appendix (Proofs)   Utility from Anticipation and Personal EquilibriumAbstract: I develop a dynamic model of individual decisionmaking in which the agent derives utility from physical outcomes as well as from rational beliefs about physical outcomes ("anticipation"), and these two payoff components can interact. Beliefs and behavior are jointly determined in a personal equilibrium by the requirement that behavior given past beliefs must be consistent with those beliefs. I explore three phenomena made possible by utility from anticipation, and prove that if the decisionmaker's behavior is distinguishable from a person's who cares only about physical outcomes, she must exhibit at least one of these phenomena. First, the decisionmaker can be prone to self-fulfilling expectations. Second, she might be time-inconsistent even if her preferences in all periods are identical. Third, she might exhibit informational preferences, where these preferences are intimately connected to her attitudes toward disappointments. Applications of the framework to reference-dependent preferences, impulsive behaviors, and emotionally difficult choices are discussed. Economic Theory (2010), 44(3), 415-444.   Futile Attempts at Self-ControlAbstract: We investigate costly yet futile attempts at self-control when consumption of a harmful product has a binary breakdown/no-breakdown nature and individuals tend to underestimate their need for self-control. Considering time-inconsistent preferences as well as temptation disutility, we show that becoming more sophisticated can decrease welfare and investigate what kind of mistaken beliefs lead to low welfare. With time-inconsistent preferences, being close to perfectly understanding one's preferences but assigning zero probability to true preferences induces the worst outcome. Joint with Paul Heidhues. Journal of the European Economic Association (2009), 7(2-3), pp. 423-434.   Reference-Dependent Consumption PlansAbstract: We develop a rational dynamic model in which people are loss averse over changes in beliefs about present and future consumption. Because changes in wealth are news about future consumption, preferences over money are reference-dependent. If news resonates more when about imminent consumption than when about future consumption, a decision maker might (to generate pleasant surprises) overconsume early relative to the optimal committed plan, increase immediate consumption following surprise wealth increases, and delay decreasing consumption following surprise losses. Since higher wealth mitigates the effect of bad news, people exhibit an unambiguous first-order precautionary-savings motive.; Web Appendix Joint with Matthew Rabin. American Economic Review (2009), 99(3), pp. 909-936.   Choices, Situations, and HappinessAbstract: This article explores some conceptual issues in the study of well-being using the traditional economic approach of inferring preferences solely from choice behavior. We argue that choice behavior alone can never reveal which situations make people better off, even with unlimited data and under the maintained hypothesis of 100% rational choice. Ancillary assumptions or additional forms of data such as happiness measures are always needed. With such ancillary assumptions and additional data, however, the use of revealed preference to study well-being can be significantly improved, so that the choices people make can jointly identify preferences, mistakes, and well-being. Joint with Matthew Rabin. Journal of Public Economics (2008), 92, pp. 1821-1832.   Competition and Price Variation when Consumers are Loss AverseAbstract: We modify the Salop (1979) model of price competition with differentiated products by assuming that consumers are loss averse relative to a reference point given by their recent expectations about the purchase. Consumers' sensitivity to losses in money increases the price responsiveness of demand--and hence the intensity of competition--at higher relative to lower market prices, reducing or eliminating price variation both within and between products. When firms face common stochastic costs, in any symmetric equilibrium the markup is strictly decreasing in cost. Even when firms face different cost distributions, we identify conditions under which a focal-price equilibrium (where firms always charge the same "focal" price) exists, and conditions under which any equilibrium is focal. (JEL D11, D43, D81, L13) Joint with Paul Heidhues. American Economic Review (2008), 98(4), pp. 1245-1268.   Drive and TalentAbstract: We analyze ways in which heterogeneity in responsiveness to incentives (“drive”) affects employees’ incentives and firms’ incentive systems in a career concerns model. On the one hand, since more driven agents work harder in response to existing incentives than less driven ones—and therefore pay is increasing in perceived drive—there is a motive to increase effort to signal high drive. These “drive-signaling incentives” are strongest with intermediate levels of existing incentives. On the other hand, because past output of a more driven agent will seem to the principal to reflect lower ability, there is an incentive to decrease effort to signal low drive. The former effect dominates early in the career, and the latter effect dominates towards the end. To maximize incentives, the principal wants to observe a noisy measure of the agent’s effort—such as the number of hours he works—early but not late in his career. Joint with Wei Li. Journal of the European Economic Association (2008), 6(1), pp. 210-236.   Reference-Dependent Risk AttitudesAbstract: We use Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2006) model of reference-dependent utility, and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences, to study preferences over monetary risk. Because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes, it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest-scale risk. It replicates “classical” prospect theory—including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses—when exposure to risk is a surprise, but implies first-order risk aversion when a risk, and the possibility of insuring it, are anticipated. A prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk. For large-scale risk, the model allows for standard “consumption utility” to dominate reference- dependent “gain-loss utility,” generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations. Joint with Matthew Rabin. American Economic Review (2007), 97(4), pp. 1047-1073. [Lead article.]   A Model of Reference-Dependent PreferencesAbstract: We develop a model of reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion where “gain–loss utility” is derived from standard “consumption utility” and the reference point is determined endogenously by the economic environment. We assume that a person’s reference point is her rational expectations held in the recent past about outcomes, which are determined in a personal equilibrium by the requirement that they must be consistent with optimal behavior given expectations. In deterministic environments, choices maximize consumption utility, but gain–loss utility influences behavior when there is uncertainty. Applying the model to consumer behavior, we show that willingness to pay for a good is increasing in the expected probability of purchase and in the expected prices conditional on purchase. In within-day labor-supply decisions, a worker is less likely to continue work if income earned thus far is unexpectedly high, but more likely to show up as well as continue work if expected income is high. Joint with Matthew Rabin. Quarterly Journal of Economics (2006), 121(4), pp. 1133-1166. [Lead article.]   Emotional AgencyAbstract: This paper models interactions between a party with anticipatory emotions and a party who responds strategically to those emotions, a situation that is common in many health, political, employment, and personal settings. An “agent” has information with both decision-making value and emotional implications for an uninformed “principal” whose utility she wants to maximize. If she cannot directly reveal her information, to increase the principal’s anticipatory utility she distorts instrumental decisions toward the action associated with good news. But because anticipatory utility derives from beliefs about instrumental outcomes, undistorted actions would yield higher ex ante total and anticipatory utility. If the agent can certifiably convey her information, she does so for good news, but unless this leads the principal to make a very costly mistake, to shelter his feelings she pretends to be uninformed when the news is bad. Quarterly Journal of Economics (2006), 121(1), pp. 121-156   Ego Utility, Overconfidence, and Task ChoiceAbstract: This paper models behavior when a decision maker cares about and manages her self-image. In addition to having preferences over material outcomes, the agent derives “ego utility” from positive views about her ability to do well in a skill-sensitive, “ambitious,” task. Although she uses Bayes’ rule to update beliefs, she tends to become overconfident regarding which task is appropriate for her. If tasks are equally informative about ability, her task choice is also overconfident. If the ambitious task is more informative about ability, she might initially display underconfidence in behavior, and, if she is disappointed by her performance, later become too ambitious. People with ego utility prefer to acquire free information in smaller pieces. Applications to employee motivation and other economic settings are discussed. Journal of the European Economic Association (2006), 4(4), pp. 673-707. [Lead article, winner of the 2008 Hicks-Tinbergen Medal for the best paper published in the Journal of the European Economic Association in the years 2006/2007.]   Tax Incidence when Individuals are Time-Inconsistent: The Case of Cigarette Excise TaxesAbstract: One of the most cogent criticisms of excise taxes is their regressivity, with lower income groups spending a much larger share of their income on goods such as cigarettes than do higher income groups. We argue that traditional quantity-based measures of incidence are only appropriate under a very restrictive ‘‘time-consistent’’ model of consumption of sin goods. A model that is much more consistent with existing evidence on smoking decisions is a time-inconsistent formulation where excise taxes on cigarettes serve a self-control function that is valued by smokers who would like to quit but cannot. This self-control function benefits lower income groups more, since they have a significantly higher price sensitivity of smoking. Calibrations show that, as a result, cigarette taxes are much less regressive than previously assumed, and are even progressive for a wide variety of parameter values. Joint with Jonathan Gruber. Journal of Public Economics (2004), 88(9-10), 1959-1987   Health Anxiety and Patient BehaviorAbstract: Economic models of patient decision-making emphasize the costs of getting medical attention and the improved physical health that results from it. This note builds a model of patient decision-making when fears or anxiety about the future—captured as beliefs about next period’s state of health— also enter the patient’s utility function. Anxiety can lead the patient to avoid doctor’s visits or other easily available information about her health. However, this avoidance cannot take any form: she will never avoid the doctor with small problems, and under regularity conditions she will never go to a bad doctor to limit the information received. Journal of Health Economics (2003), 22(6), pp. 1073-1084   Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and RetirementAbstract: Some people have self-control problems regularly. This paper adds endogenous retirement to Laibson’s quasi-hyperbolic discounting savings model [Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997) 443–477]. Earlier selves think that the deciding self tends to retire too early and may save less to induce later retirement. Still earlier selves may think the pre-retirement self does this too much, saving more to induce early retirement. The consumption pattern may be different from that with exponential discounting. Other observational non-equivalence includes the impact of changing mandatory retirement rules or work incentives on savings and a possibly negative marginal propensity to consume out of increased future earnings. Naive agents are briefly considered. Joint with Peter Diamond. Journal of Public Economics (2003), 87(9-10), pp. 1839-1872 [Lead article.]   Is Addiction `Rational?' Theory and EvidenceAbstract: This paper makes two contributions to the modeling of addiction. First, we provide new and convincing evidence that smokers are forward-looking in their smoking decisions, using state excise tax increases that have been legislatively enacted but are not yet effective, and monthly data on consumption. Second, we recognize the strong evidence that preferences with respect to smoking are time inconsistent, with individuals both not recognizing the true difficulty of quitting and searching for self-control devices to help them quit. We develop a new model of addictive behavior that takes as its starting point the standard “rational addiction” model, but incorporates time-inconsistent preferences. This model also exhibits forward-looking behavior, but it has strikingly different normative implications; in this case optimal government policy should depend not only on the externalities that smokers impose on others but also on the “internalities” imposed by smokers on themselves. We estimate that the optimal tax per pack of cigarettes should be at least one dollar higher under our formulation than in the rational addiction case. Joint with Jonathan Gruber. Quarterly Journal of Economics (2001), 116(4), pp. 1261-1305   Comparison of Magnetocaloric Properties from Magnetic and Thermal MeasurementsAbstract: The isothermal change of the magnetic entropy of a magnetically ordered material upon application of external magnetic field can be calculated from the temperature and field dependence of the magnetization or of the specific heat. The adiabatic temperature change, i.e., the magnetocaloric effect ~MCE! can be measured directly or can be calculated via different methods using the field-dependent specific heat values, or a combination of data obtained via magnetization and thermal measurements. In the present study, magnetic and thermal measurements were carried out on Gd75Y25(TC=232 K) and Gd48Y52(TC=161 K) samples, for applied fields ranging between 0 and 7 T. From both datasets, the magnetic entropy change and MCE values were calculated and compared, in order to assess the mutual reliability of the methods applied. The magnetically or thermally deduced specific heat discontinuities show a reasonable agreement within experimental error. Similar comparison of the calculated magnetic entropy changes reveals that the measured transition temperature and the shape of the curve do not depend on the method selected. It is demonstrated that the choice of an integration constant during entropy calculation has a significant impact on the adiabatic temperature change deduced from the field and temperature dependence of the entropies. For the MCE, a better approximation can be obtained using the magnetically acquired magnetic entropy change and the field-dependent specific heat. The results prove that magnetic measurements carried out in high enough magnetic fields provide reliable information on the isothermal magnetic entropy change and, when combined with field-dependent specific heat measurements, on the magnetocaloric effect as well. Joint with M. Foldeaki, W. Schnelle, E. Gmelin, P. Benard, A. Giguere, R. Chahine, and T. K. Bose. Journal of Applied Physics (1997), 82(1), pp. 309-316  

◆ 著名宏观经济学家Kjetil Storesletten

2015-12-15

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Kjetil Storesletten是挪威奥斯陆大学、瑞士苏黎世大学经济学教授，研究领域为数量宏观、资产定价、经济增长、中国经济。除了担任Scandinavian Journal of Economics的主编，他也是五大经济学期刊之一The Review of Economic Studies的...编辑部主席。   http://folk.uio.no/kjstore/     Kjetil Storesletten Professor, University of Oslo Editor, Scandinavian Journal of Economics Additional affiliations: University of Zurich, and CEPR Email: kjetil.storesletten [at] econ.uio.no Advanced Grant from the European Research Council, 2013-2017, "The Macroeconomics of Inequality, Development and the Welfare State" CV Working papers Scientific Publications Quantitative macro and inequality in macroeconomics China, economic growth and transition Political Economy Immigration Comments and chapters in books Articles in Norwegian Newspapers A description of my research: Inequality in macroeconomics Contact details   Photo: Jonny Syversen More picures Working papers Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework (2014), with Heathcote and Violante. NBER WP No. 19899, (formerly titled as “Redistributive Taxation in a Partial Insurance Economy”). Sharing High Growth Across Generations: Pensions and Demographic Transition in China (2014 NEW VERSION), with Song, Wang, and Zilibotti. Growing (with Capital Controls) Like China (2014 NEW VERSION), with Song and Zilibotti. Most Recent Publications:  Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework American Economic Review, (2014, forthcoming), with Heathcote and Violante.   China's Great Convergence and Beyond Annual Review of Economics (2014, forthcoming) with Zilibotti. Publications: Inequality in Macroeconomics The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 118(4), August 2010, 681-722, with Heathcote and Violante. Download here the Technical Appendix. Quantitative Macroeconomics with Heterogeneous Households, Annual Review of Economics, vol. 1, 2009, pp 319-354, with Heathcote and Violante. Insurance and Opportunities: A Welfare Analysis of Labor Market Risk, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 55 (3), 2008, pp.501-525, with Heathcote and Violante Taxes and the Global Allocation of Capital, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 55 (1), 2008, pp. 48-61, with Backus and Henriksen. Asset pricing with idiosyncratic risk and overlapping generations, Review of Economic Dynamics, 2007, vol. 10 (4), pp. 519-548, with Telmer and Yaron. Two Views of Inequality Over the Life-Cycle, Journal of the European Economic Association (2005, vol. 3 (2-3), pp. 543-52, with Heathcote and Violante. Cyclical Dynamics in Idiosyncratic Labor-Market Risk, Journal of Political Economy, 2004, vol. 112 (3), pp. 695-717, with Telmer and Yaron. Consumption and Risk Sharing over the Life Cycle, Journal of Monetary Economics, 2004, vol. 51, pp. 609-633, with Telmer and Yaron. The Welfare Costs of Business Cycles Revisited: Finite Lives and Cyclical Variation in Idiosyncratic Risk, European Economic Review, 2001, vol. 45 (7), pp. 1311-1339, with Telmer and Yaron. How Important Are Idiosyncratic Shocks? Evidence from Labor Supply, American Economic Review, May 2001, vol. 91 (2), pp. 413-17, with Telmer and Yaron. The risk sharing implications of alternative social security arrangements ,Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1999, vol. 50, pp. 213-59, with Telmer and Yaron.. Publications: China, Economic Growth and Transition Growing Like China, American Economic Review, 2011, vol. 101(1), pp. 196-233, with Song and Zilibotti. Download also the Technical Appendix. Education, educational policy and growth, Swedish Economic Policy Review, 2000, vol. 7, pp. 39-70, with Zilibotti. Publications: Political Economy Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt, Econometrica, Vol. 80(6), November 2012, 2785-2804, with Song and Zilibotti. Download here the Supplemental Material and the Matlab code. Democratic Public Good Provision , Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 133 (1), pp. 127-151, with Hassler and Zilibotti. The Dynamics of Government , Journal of Monetary Economics, 2005, vol 52 (7) pp. 1331-1358, with Hassler, Krusell, and Zilibotti. Download here the Technical Appendix. A Positive Theory of Geographical Mobility and Social Insurance, International Economc Review, 2005, vol. 46 (1), pp. 263-303, with Hassler, Rodriguez Mora, and Zilibotti. The Survival of the Welfare State, American Economic Review, March 2003, vol. 93 (1), pp. 87-112, with Hassler, Rodriguez-Mora and Zilibotti. Download here the figures  and the Technical Appendix. Dynamic Political Choice in Macroeconomics, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003, vol. 1 (2-3), pp. 543-52, with J. Hassler and F. Zilibotti Publications: Immigration Sustaining Fiscal Policy Through Immigration, Journal of Political Economy, 2000, vol. 108 (2), pp. 300-23. Fiscal Implications of Immigration - A Net Present Value Calculation, Scandinavian Journal of Economics., 2003, vol 105 (3), pp. 487-506. Dissertation The Economics of Immigration, defended in 1995 at Carnegie Mellon University. Comments and chapters in books Asset Prices and Intergenerational Risk Sharing: the Role of Idiosyncratic Earnings Shocks, in Handbooks in Finance; Handbook of the Equity Risk Premium, edited by Rajnish Mehra, Elsevier, Amsterdam: 2008, pp. 565-590, with Telmer and Yaron. Discussion of Heaton and Lucas’ “Can heterogeneity, undiversified risk, and trading frictions solve the equity premium puzzle?”, In Handbooks in Finance; Handbook of the Equity Risk Premium, edited by Rajnish Mehra, Elsevier, Amsterdam: 2008, pp. 555-564. Comments on: “Hong and Ríos-Rull's ‘Social security, life insurance and annuities for families’” Journal of Monetary Economics, 2007, vol 54 (1), pp. 141-143  Comment on Krueger and Perri: On the Welfare Consequences of the Increase in Inequality in the United States?, NBER Macroeconomics Annuals 2003. Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, editors. MIT Press, 2004, pp. 132-137. Unemployment, Specialization, and Collective Preferences for Social Insurance , In The New Economics of Rising Inequalities, pp. 331-50, edited by Daniel Cohen, Thomas Piketty and Gilles Saint-Paul, Oxford University Press, 2001. Joint with Hassler, Rodriguez Mora, and Zilibotti. Comment on Dustmann: Temporary migration and economic assimilation, Swedish Economic Policy Review 7, 2000. Comment on Krueger and Lindahl: Education for growth in Sweden and the world, Swedish Economic Policy Review 6, 1999.  

◆ Michèle Tertilt

2015-12-15

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Michèle Tertilt Professor of Economics University of Mannheim Mannheim Center for Macroeconomics and Finance     Research I...nterests: Macroeconomics, Family Economics Consumer Credit, Growth and Development click for high resolution Michèle Tertilt is a Professor of Economics at the University of Mannheim. She is currently a Managing Editor at the Review of Economic Studies. Furthermore, she is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Development Economics. She is also a Research Affiliate at BREAD and the European Development Research Network (EUDN) and a Research Fellow at CEPR. In September 2013 she was awarded the Gossenpreis - an annual award by the Verein für Socialpolitik which recognizes the best published economist under 45 working in the German speaking area. She is the first woman to win this prestigious prize. Her research concentrates on macroeconomics with a special focus on development and intra-family interactions. She has also worked on consumer credit and bankruptcies. Recently, Michèle Tertilt received a five-year ERC Starting Grant. Her previous research was financed through an NSF CAREER grant (2008-2011), a Sloan Research Fellowship (2009-2011) and an NSF grant (2005-2008). Prior to joining the University of Mannheim, Michèle Tertilt was an Assistant Professor at Stanford University. She also spent a year at the University of Pennsylvania and one year as a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution. She studied economics at Bielefeld University and obtained her PhD from the University of Minnesota. Detailed CV here.   Michèle Tertilt http://tertilt.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/    Michèle Terti    

◆ 著名城市经济学家：Edward Glaeser

2015-12-15

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  Edward Glaeser is the Fred and Eleanor Glimp Professor of Economics in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University, where he has ...taught since 1992. He regularly teaches microeconomics theory, and occasionally urban and public economics. He has served as Director of the Taubman Center for State and Local Government, and Director of the Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston. He has published dozens of papers on cities economic growth, law, and economics. In particular, his work has focused on the determinants of city growth and the role of cities as centers of idea transmission. He received his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1992. http://scholar.harvard.edu/glaeser   Edward Glaeser自1992年从芝加哥大学经济系获得博士学位后，一直任教于哈佛大学经济系。他的主要研究领域是城市经济学、法律经济学、公共经济学。Edward Glaeser2005年当选计量经济学会会士，现任哈佛大学经济系 Fred and Eleanor Glimp经济学讲座教授。      

◆ Carmen M. Reinhart

2015-12-15

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Carmen M. Reinhart Minos A. Zombanakis Professor of the International Financial System John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University &nb...sp; Carmen M. Reinhart     Carmen M. Reinhart is the Minos A. Zombanakis Professor of the International Financial System at Harvard Kennedy School. Previously, she was the Dennis Weatherstone Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for International Economics at the University of Maryland. Professor Reinhart held positions as Chief Economist and Vice President at the investment bank Bear Stearns in the 1980s.  She spent several years at the International Monetary Fund.  Reinhart is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a member of the Congressional Budget Office Panel of Economic Advisers and the Economic Advisory Panel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  She has been listed among Bloomberg Markets Most Influential 50 in Finance.  Reinhart has written on a variety of topics in macroeconomics and international finance.  She has served on numerous editorial boards and has testified before congress. Her work has helped to inform the understanding of financial crises for over a decade. Her best-selling book (with Kenneth S. Rogoff)  entitled This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly  documents the striking similarities of the recurring booms and busts that have characterized financial history and has been translated to over 20 languages and won the 2010 Paul A. Samuelson TIAA-CREF Institute Award, among others.   http://www.carmenreinhart.com/

◆ 2013年费雪布莱克奖得主Ulrike Malmendier

2015-12-10

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Ulrike Malmendier,德国人,德国国籍,德国波恩大学经济学学士(1995),经济学硕士(1996)和法学博士(2000),哈佛大学经济系&商学院商业经济学学博士（2002），2002-2006在斯坦福大学商学院担任助理教授,2006年加州大学伯克利分校挖来当助理教授,2006-...2008为助理教授,2008-2012为副教授,2012至今他是加州大学伯克利分校经济系的经济学正教授和哈斯商学院的金融学正教授。2013年担任Edward J. and Mollie Arnold讲座教授。   2013年获得美国金融学会颁发的Fischer Black Prize。     Ulrike Malmendier的研究领域：Corporate Finance, Behavioral Economics/Behavioral Finance, Economics of Organizations, Contract Theory, Law and Economics, Law and Finance   Ulrike Malmendier在哈斯金融系的主页： http://facultybio.haas.berkeley.edu/faculty-list/malmendier-ulrike   Education PhD, Business Economics, Harvard University AM, Business Economics, Harvard University PhD, Law, University of Bonn MA in Economics, University of Bonn BA equiv., Law, University of Bonn BA, Economics, University of Bonn Positions Held At Haas since 2010 2012 - present, Professor of Finance, Haas School of Business 2012 - present, Professor of Economics, University of California Berkeley 2009 - present, Research Associate, Corporate Finance and Labor Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 2007 - present, Research Affiliate, Financial Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 2006 - present, Research Affiliate, Labour Economics, CEPR 2006 - present, Affiliate, CESifo 2005 - present, Faculty Research Fellow, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 2010 - 2012, Associate Professor of Finance (with tenure), Haas School of Business 2008 - 2012, Associate Professor of Economics (with tenure), University of California, Berkeley 2006 - 2009, Faculty Research Fellow, Corporate Finance, NBER 2006 - 2008, Assistant Professor of Economics, UC Berkeley 2004 - 2009, Faculty Research Fellow, Labor Economics, NBER 2002 - 2006, Assistant Professor of Finance, Stanford Graduate School of Business Visiting Positions 2005, Visiting Fellow, Department of Economics, Princeton University 2005, Visiting Assistant Professor of Finance, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago 2000, Visiting Scholar, Max Planck Institute "Law of Common Goods," Bonn (Germany) 1998, Visiting Scholar, Nuttfield College, Oxford University External Service and Assignments Editorial positions: Guest Associate Editor, Management Science, Special Issue on Behavioral Economics and Finance Associate Editor, Journal of the European Economic Association Associate Editor, Journal of Financial Intermediation Associate Editor, Economic Journal Program committees: American Finance Association, Western Finance Association, Financial Management Association, European Finance Association, Financial Intermediation Research Society (FIRS) conference, Annual Conference in Corporate Finance, Washington University Memberships: Econometric Society, American Economic Association, American Finance Association Referee Service: Academy of Management Review, American Economic Review, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Econometrica, Economic Journal, Economic Letters, Experimental Economics, Financial Management, Games and Economic Behavior, German Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Literature, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of European Economic Association, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Labor Economics, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Labour Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Management Science, RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economics and Statistics, Review of Finance, Review of Financial Studies   Current Research and Interests Corporate Finance, Behavioral Economics/Behavioral Finance, Economics of Organizations, Contract Theory, Law and Economics, Law and Finance Selected Papers and Publications "Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect Risk-Taking?" with S. Nagel. Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 211, vol.126(1), pp. 373-416. "The Bidder's Curse," with H. Lee. American Economics Review, April 2011, vol.101(2), pp. 749-787. "Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements," with J. Lerner. American Economics Review, March 2010, vol. 100 (1), pp. 214-246. "Law and Finance at the Origin," Journal of Economic Literature, December 2009, vol. 47(4), pp. 1076-1108. "Superstar CEOs," with G. Tate. Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 2009, vol. 124(4), pp. 1593-1638. Honors and Awards “Rising Star in Finance” award, Fordham/NYU Rising Stars conference 2012, New York Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellow, 2010 - 2012 Citation of Excellence by Emerald Management Reviews, 2009 Coleman Fung Risk Management Research Center Grant, 2008 Kauffman Foundation Grant, 2008 Instructional Improvement Grant, 2007 Center on the Economics and Demography of Aging Grant, 2007 Abigail Reynolds Hodgen Publication Fund grant, 2007   Ulrike Malmendier的个人主页：http://eml.berkeley.edu/~ulrike/