JFE五星论文:所有权结构与公司借款成本
文件大小：未知
级别评定：★★★★★
添加时间：2016-01-11 13:52:42
最后更新：2016-01-20 14:21:53
下载积分：0分 （只有会员文件下载时才需要相应积分验证）
总浏览：
总下载：20
发布人：george15135
- 如果您发现该资源不能下载，请在本站论坛提出，管理员会及时处理。
- 未经本站明确许可，任何网站不得非法盗链及抄袭本站资源。
- 本站资源均为网友提供交流，仅供教学、研究使用，请下载后24小时内自行删除。
资源简介
Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing
Chen Lin
The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics
(马跃) Yue Ma
City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) - Department of Economics & Finance
Paul H. Malatesta
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business
Yuhai Xuan
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Finance
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 100, Issue 1, April 2011, pp. 1--23 (Lead Article; First Place Winner of the 2011 Jensen Prize for the Best Paper in the Areas of Corporate Finance and Organizations published in the Journal of Financial Economics; Journal of Financial Economics All-Star Paper).
Abstract:
This article identifies an important channel through which excess control rights affect firm value. Using a new, hand-collected data set on corporate ownership and control of 3,468 firms in 22 countries during the 1996–2008 period, we find that the cost of debt financing is significantly higher for companies with a wider divergence between the largest ultimate owner’s control rights and cash-flow rights and investigate factors that affect this relation. Our results suggest that potential tunneling and other moral hazard activities by large shareholders are facilitated by their excess control rights. These activities increase the monitoring costs and the credit risk faced by banks and, in turn, raise the cost of debt for the borrower.
Keywords: Ownership structure, Excess control rights, Control-ownership wedge, Cost of debt, Bank loans
JEL Classification: G21, G32, G34
