董事选举重要吗？（Do Director Elections Matter？）
文件大小：未知
级别评定：
添加时间：2015-09-28 13:45:00
最后更新：2015-09-28 14:03:52
下载积分：0分 （只有会员文件下载时才需要相应积分验证）
总浏览：
总下载：4
发布人：george15135
- 如果您发现该资源不能下载，请在本站论坛提出，管理员会及时处理。
- 未经本站明确许可，任何网站不得非法盗链及抄袭本站资源。
- 本站资源均为网友提供交流，仅供教学、研究使用，请下载后24小时内自行删除。
资源简介
Do Director Elections Matter?
Vyacheslav Fos
Boston College - Department of Finance
Kai Li
University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business; China Academy of Financial Research (CAFR)
Margarita Tsoutsoura
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
July 2, 2015
Abstract:
Using a hand-collected sample of more than 30,000 directors nominated for election over the period 2001–2010, we construct a novel measure of director proximity to elections — Distance-from-election. We find that the closer a director is to her next election, the higher is CEO turnover–performance sensitivity. Each year closer to director elections is associated with a 23% increase in CEO turnover–performance sensitivity. Three tests support a causal interpretation. Cross-sectional tests further show that, when other governance mechanisms are in place, CEO turnover–performance sensitivity is less affected by Distance-from-election. We conclude that director elections have important governance implications.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 52
Keywords: agency problems, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, corporate governance, director elections, staggered boards
JEL Classification: G34, G38
