注册 投稿
经济金融网 中国经济学教育科研网 中国经济学年会 EFN通讯社

Can Firms with Political Connections Borrow More Than Those Without?

文件大小:未知

级别评定:★★★★★

添加时间:2015-12-16 17:02:10

最后更新:2015-12-23 08:28:22

下载积分:0分 (只有会员文件下载时才需要相应积分验证)

总浏览:

总下载:2

发布人:george15135

  • 如果您发现该资源不能下载,请在本站论坛提出,管理员会及时处理。
  • 未经本站明确许可,任何网站不得非法盗链及抄袭本站资源。
  • 本站资源均为网友提供交流,仅供教学、研究使用,请下载后24小时内自行删除。
    0
资源简介

Fu, J, D Shimamoto, and Y Todo (2015), “Can Firms with Political Connections Borrow More Than Those Without? Evidence from Firm-Level Data for Indonesia”, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI),

It has been widely argued that firms obtain loans with relaxed terms if they are politically connected. This column presents evidence from Indonesia that firms whose owners or directors have a personal relationship with a politician are more likely to have their loans approved by state-owned banks, and are more likely to receive the full amount applied for. However, the labour productivity of such firms is on average lower. This suggests that in some cases, politically connected lending may distort the efficiency of resource allocation and be detrimental to economic development.

 

http://www.voxeu.org/article/development-and-political-connections-firms

资源评论

快速入口
回到顶部
深圳网站建设