Bribe payments under regulatory decentralization: Evidence from rights offering

论文简介：

This paper investigates why and how firms’ corrupt behavior varies as a result of the interaction between firms and local public officials under regulatory decentralization. Using a unique data set on China’s listed firms’ bribe payments under the decentralized regulatory system for rights offerings implemented prior to 2001 in China, we find that firms located in the regions with a high degree of local government intervention in the economy tend to pay high bribes to local officials, and that firms located in the regions with a high degree of marketization of the local bank financing mechanism pay low bribes. We also find that firms with serious Jensen-type agency problems are more willing to bribe local officials. We further demonstrate that after termination of the regulatory system for rights offerings, bribe payments are substantially reduced, and the degree of local government intervention in the economy as well as the severity of Jensen agency problems in listed firms can no longer explain the variation in bribe payments. Our findings shed light on how the delegation of government authority and corporate governance exacerbates firms’ corruption under regulatory decentralization.

作者简介：

安云碧教授是加拿大皇后大学（Queen’s University at Kingston）金融学博士，现为温莎大学Odette 商学院教授。安云碧教授的研究兴趣主要包括：期权定价，资产组合选择和实证金融，其研究成果发表在Financial Management, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of International Money and Finance, Journal of Futures Markets等国际著名期刊上。另外，安教授曾多次受邀在WFA(The Western Finance Association),  EFA (The Eastern Finance Association)年会上做学术报告并担任分会场主席。