为什么有些信贷繁荣会导致金融危机，而一些信贷繁荣不会导致金融危机？

Abstract

Credit booms usually precede financial crises. However, some credit booms end in a crisis (bad booms) and others do not (good booms). We document that,while all booms start with an increase of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and Labor Productivity (LP), such growth falls much faster subsequently for bad booms.We then develop a simple framework to explain this. Firms finance investment opportunities with short-term collateralized debt. If agents do not produce information about the collateral quality, a credit boom develops, accommodating firms
with lower quality projects and increasing the incentives of lenders to acquire information about the collateral, eventually triggering a crisis. When the average quality of investment opportunities also grows, the credit boom may not end in a crisis because the gradual adoption of low quality projects is not strong enough to induce information about collateral. Finally, we also test the main predictions of the model.